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CASENOTES
COMMERCE CLAUSE, ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE, OR
NEITHER? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT IN BRZONKALA V.
MORRISON
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 1994, two men raped Christy Brzonkala in her
dormitory room at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity ("Virginia Tech").' Unfortunately, this kind of event is not a rare
occurrence in the United States. "According to the U.S. Department
of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS"), women are the
victims of more than 4.5 million violent crimes each year. This
alarming figure includes approximately 500,000 rapes or other
sexual assaults."2 In light of these statistics, and "after four years of
hearings, Congress enacted [the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 ("VAWA" or "the Act")], a comprehensive federal statute
designed to address 'the escalating problem of violent crime against
women."'3 Title III of the VAWA establishes a federal substantive
right that all persons within the United States shall have the right
to be free from crimes of gender-motivated violence.4 To enforce this
right, the Act creates a private cause of action against any person
committing a gender-motivated crime and allows compensatory
1. See Danielle M. Houck, VAWA after Lopez: Reconsidering Congressional Power under
the FourteenthAmendment in Light ofBrzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 626 (1998).
2. MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1 (1998).
3. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 962-63 (4th Cir.
1997), rev'd en bane, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993)).
4. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)
(1994)).
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damages, punitive damages, injunctive, declaratory, or any other
appropriate relief.5
Brzonkala, one of the first women to sue under the VAWA in
federal court, left school due to her dissatisfaction with Virginia
Tech's response to her rape and because she feared her rapists, both
football players at Virginia Tech.6 However, on March 5, 1999, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that section 13981
was an unconstitutional exercise of power to regulate interstate
commerce because it "neither regulates an economic activity nor
contains a jurisdictional element."7
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari8 and oral
argument before the Supreme Court took place on January 11,
2000. 9 The 'Virginia Tech case" has been watched closely by citizens
of the Commonwealth of Virginia and across the nation. Nobody
denies the shocking statistics of gender-motivated violence sweeping
our nation. The essential question remains, howeveri, whether
Congress may intrude into areas that are traditionally of state
concern and constitutionally create a private right of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence.
Part II of this casenote examines the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and lays the foundation on which the Fourth Circuit
analyzed this case. Part III documents the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Brzonkala, including Judge Motz's dissent. Part IV analyzes the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, including an examination of other federal
court holdings on the issue. Part V forecasts the Supreme Court's
analysis of this issue. Finally, Part VI concludes by discussing the
implications of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning on future Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and the need for a precise analysis of current
Commerce Clause authority by the Supreme Court.
II. HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tilo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
5. See id. § 13981(c).
6. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953-56.
7. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 833.
8. See Brzonkala v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (Sept. 28, 1999) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
9. For a transcript of the oral argument, see Brzonkala v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29,
2000 WL 41232 (Jan. 11, 2000).
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with the Indian Tribes."" The Supreme Court has changed its
interpretation of this clause many times since it was written. Chief
Justice Marshall offered the venerable first definition of Congress's
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden:"
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse.... [The commerce power] is the
power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is
to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.
12
Early cases concerning the Commerce Clause were more involved
with limiting state actions than restricting acts of Congress.3
However, after Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887" and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890," a new era of federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause power began. 6 The Supreme
Court reasoned that while areas of interstate commerce were
reserved for regulation by the federal government, "Congress could
not regulate activities such as 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and
'mining.'"' Yet, the Court stated that if the interstate and intrastate
aspects of commerce were so entwined that the regulation of one
necessitated control of the other, Congress, and not the states, was
entitled to prescribe the final rule.'
In the early 1930s, the Supreme Court used the directtindirect
test. This test distinguished between activities that directly affected
interstate commerce and those that indirectly affected interstate
commerce,' 9 Congress's regulatory power extended only to those
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12. Id. at 189-190, 196.
13. See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888).
14. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
15. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).
16. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995).
17. Id.
18. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AIUERICA (2d ed. 1995); see, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,
351-52 (914) (collectively known as the Shreveport Rate Cases).
19. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,542-50 (1935).
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activities that directly affected commerce.2" The directlindirect
distinction lasted only a short while.2
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,22 United States v. Darby,23
and Wickard v. Filburn24 began a new "era of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined
authority of Congress under that Clause."25 In Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., the Court departed from the direct/indirect analysis and
held "that intrastate activities that 'have such a close and substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions' are within Congress'[s] power to regulate."26 In Darby, the
Court extended the Commerce Clause power to those intrastate
activities "which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the
power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce."27
Finally, in Wickard, which has been called "the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,"2
the Supreme Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
193829 could constitutionally be applied to the production and
consumption of wheat grown by a farmer for his own family.3 ° The
Court, in Wickard, reasoned that even though the activity may be
local, intrastate, and not regarded as commerce, if it has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce, regardless of whether this effect
is direct or indirect, then Congress may constitutionally regulate
it. 3 ' While greatly expanding Commerce Clause authority, the Court
continued to warn that the scope of interstate commerce power
should not extend to such an indirect and remote effect on interstate
20. See id.
21. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1937) (holding the new
test to be one of degree). Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. was decided only two years after
AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
24. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
26. Id. at 555 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 36-38).
27. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118.
28. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
29. Ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-93, 1340 (1994 &
Supp. IJI 1997)).
30. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
31. See id. at 125.
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commerce that it would destroy our dual-government system.32
Since then, the Court has used a rational basis test to determine
whether an activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce so as to
warrant regulation without violating the constitutional division of
power.33
This interpretation of the Commerce Clause expanded the power
of Congress to regulate a myriad of activities. In addition, the Court
held in the Civil Rights Cases34 that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant Congress the power to enact laws
directed towards the actions of private individuals, but only to enact
laws directed at state action. The Court's expansive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, however, afforded Congress an alternative
power to address civil liberties. For example, in Katzenbach v.
McClung,36 the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964" as it
applied to a local restaurant.38 The Court reasoned that this activity
was within Congress's Commerce Clause power merely because the
restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, bought food that had moved in
commerce. 9 So long as the Court can find that Congress had a
rational basis for determining that the activity sufficiently affected
interstate commerce so as to be regulated, the Court will allow the
regulation. In addition, the Court has stated that so long as the
general regulatory statute has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, even de minimis individual instances that fall under the
statute may be included in the regulation."
32. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
33. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding
that whether an activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce so as to fall under the
Commerce Clause power is a judicial rather than a legislative question); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
34. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
35. See id. at 11.
36. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
37. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a)-(c)
(1994)).
38. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302 (holding that within the purview of the Commerce
Clause is the power to affect activities that "directly or indirectly burden or obstruct
interstate commerce"); see also Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (holding that the Civil
Rights Act may be applied to a motel under the Commerce Clause power because racial
discrimination has an effect on interstate commerce).
39. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-05.
40. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968).
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The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez41
narrowed the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 42 For the
first time in sixty years, the Court struck down an act of Congress
because it violated the Commerce Clause.43 Because the Court
followed a heightened level of scrutiny and overturned the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,' Lopez has been criticized as sending a
mixed message, and its significance remains unclear.45 Based on its
authority to regulate interstate commerce, Congress passed the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it a federal offense to possess a
firearm within a school zone.46 The Court reasoned that there are
three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
Commerce Clause power: (1) use of channels of interstate commerce;
(2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce; and (3) activities with a substantial relation
to interstate commerce.47 The Court quickly determined that the Act
did not fall under either of the first two categories and focused its
reasoning on the third category.4" In its analysis, the Court looked
to the fact that section 922(q) is not a part of a larger regulation of
an economic activity and that section 922(q) did not contain a
"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce."
49
This portion of the Court's holding has created much confusion.
Many interpret the Court's meaning as requiring either that the
activity being regulated be economic in nature, or that the statute
have a jurisdictional element in order to prove the activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce. 50 However, the Court does not
41. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42. See id. at 561 (holding that Congress had offended the Commerce Clause in reaching
an activity that had a tenuous connection with interstate commerce).
43. See Mark Hansen, Crossing the State Line? Violence Against Women Act Battered in
Test of Congressional Powers under Commerce Clause, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 28.
44. Pub. Law No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(1)(A)-(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
45. See Houck, supra note 1, at 636-37.
46. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a(a)-
(c) (1994)).
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
48. See id. at 561-62.
49. Id. at 561.
50. See, e.g., MargaretA. Cain, The Civil Rights Provision of the ViolenceAgainst Women
Act: Its Legacy and Future, 34 TULSA L.J. 367, 401-03 (1999); Sara E. Kropf, The Failure of
United States v. Lopez: Analyzing the Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REV. L.&
WOMEN'S STUD. 373, 395-97 (1999); Judi L. Lemos, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994:
Connecting Gender Motivated Violence to Interstate Commerce, 21 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1251,
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expressly state that these two factors are requirements. Instead, the
Court simply used these two factors in the Lopez case to draw its
conclusion that the presence of guns in schools does not substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.5 The Court also considered the
fact that congressional findings were absent.52
Scholars have disagreed as to the impact Lopez will have on
Commerce Clause precedent.53 Some language may indicate that the
Supreme Court is changing its view of the Commerce Clause, but
without further cases to substantiate the change, federal courts are
hesitant to overturn acts of Congress under Lopez alone.54 However,
since Lopez, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every case
dealing with the Commerce Clause until now."
III. BRZONKALA v. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE
UNIVERSITY 56
A. Facts and Procedural History
Christy Brzonkala brought an action under section 13981 of the
VAWA in federal district court against defendants Morrison and
Crawford alleging that the two forcibly raped her in her dormitory
room at Virginia Tech.5" Brzonkala alleged that the rape, coupled
with Morrison's comments: "You better not have any f* * *ing
diseases"" and "I like to get girls drunk and f* * * the s* * * out of
them"59 violated her right under section 13981 to be free from
gender-motivated crimes of violence. 0 The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and, in the alternative, if the
complaint did state a claim, because Congress did not have constitu-
tional authority to pass section 13981.61 The government joined
Brzonkala and defended the section as a constitutional exercise of
1255-58 (1998).
51. See sources cited supra note 50.
52. See Lopez at 562-63.
53. Cf. Houck, supra note 1; Kropf, supra note 50; Antony Barone Kolenc, Note,
Commerce Clause Challenges after United States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REv. 867, 931 (1998).
54. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 931.
55. See Hansen, supra note 43, at 28.
56. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
57. See id. at 827.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and alternatively,
as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.62
The district court concluded that section 13981 of the Act was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power,
using the Supreme Court's holding in Lopez to support its
reasoning.6 3 The district court concluded that section 13981 was also
not within section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because
Congress may not regulate purely private conduct under that
section.'
The government and Brzonkala appealed the decision, and on
December 23, 1997, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court and held that section 13981 was
a legitimate exercise of Commerce Clause power.65 The panel
reasoned that according to Lopez and prior Commerce Clause cases,
"a reviewing court need only determine 'whether a rational basis
existed for concluding that a regulated activity' substantially affects
interstate commerce." 66 The court found the extensive congressional
findings to be an important difference between this case and Lopez
and reasoned that although Lopez refused to expand Congress's
commerce power to uphold section 922(q), it did not overrule any
Commerce Clause precedent or abandon the rational basis test.
67
Because (1) Congress made extensive findings; (2) VAWA is a civil
rather than criminal statute; (3) VAWA involves an area of gener-
ally federal responsibility-civil rights; and (4) VAWA supplements
rather than supplants state laws, the Fourth Circuit panel held that
Congress had constitutional authority to enact section 13981.68
Furthermore, the court noted that Lopez did not require a jurisdic-
tional element or that the regulated activity be economic, but if it
had, VAWA "regulates an activity that is 'an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity.'"6 9 Two months later, the full
62. See id. at 828.
63. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,786 (W.D.
Va. 1996).
64. See id. at 796.
65. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,974 (4th Cir.
1997).
66. Id. at 965 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 972 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63).
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court vacated the judgment and reheard the case en banc on March
3, 1998.70
B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
A year after hearing oral argument in the case, the Fourth
Circuit, in a seven to four decision, affirmed the district court's
ruling that Brzonkala properly stated a claim under section 13981,
but held that section 13981 of VAWA "simply cannot be reconciled
with the principles of limited federal government upon which this
Nation is founded."7' Judge Luttig, writing for the court, noted that
Brzonkala first defended section 13981 as a constitutional exercise
of power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but after
the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,72 resorted
to defending the section under the Commerce Clause power.73
Therefore, the court focused its discussion on the Commerce Clause
power.
1. The Commerce Clause
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the Supreme Court
"substantially clarified the scope and the limits of Congress'[s]
Article I, Section 8 power" in Lopez, it should base its analysis of the
case on the standards set forth in Lopez.74 The court interpreted
Lopez as holding that in order for an activity to substantially affect
interstate commerce so that it may be regulated under the Com-
merce Clause, the activity must either
(1)... arise out of or [be] connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce, [or] (2) [be a regulation that] include[s] a jurisdictional
element to ensure, "through case-by-case inquiry," that each specific
70. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999).
71. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir.
1999).
72. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Enforcement Clause is limited to remedial regulation addressed
toward state action).
73. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826.
74. Id. at 830.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:567
application of the regulation involves activity that in fact affects
interstate commerce. 5
The court then analogized section 13981 to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, finding that section 13981 does not regulate an economic
activity or contain a jurisdictional element just as the Gun-Free
School Zones Act neither regulated an economic activity nor had a
jurisdictional element.76 For this reason, the court concluded section
13981 "cannot be sustained in the authority of Lopez, nor any of the
Court's previous Commerce Clause holdings, as a constitutional
exercise of Congress'[s] power to regulate interstate commerce."77
According to the court, section 13981 regulates violent crime that
is not commercial and, therefore, not economic. 78 The court recog-
nized the reaffirmation of Wickard v. Filburn79 in Lopez, but stated
that "the decision does not, in such circumstances, authorize the
regulation of intrastate conduct falling outside even the Court's
relatively generous conception of economic activity."8" In addition,
the court advanced the idea that it is the court's duty to carefully
ponder the implications of its holdings upon our federal system of
government especially when it concerns an area of law that has
historically been reserved for the states.8 ' States have historically
been sovereign over the areas of criminal law and domestic rela-
tions.82 To the Fourth Circuit, gender-motivated violence does not
affect interstate commerce any differently than any other significant
problem does.83
The court rejected Brzonkala's argument that section 13981
differed from section 922(q) because of the extensive congressional
findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce, stating that:
If we were to hold that a statute like section 13981, which regulates
purely private, noneconomic activity at the very core of traditional
75. Id. at 831 (citations omitted) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
76. See id. at 830-31.
77. Id. at 833; see also Kropf, supra note 50, at 391 ("The majority opinion by Judge Luttig
analyzed the case under Lopez and concluded that because VAWA did not directly regulate
an economic activity or contain a jurisdictional element, it did not satisfy the Lopez
standard.").
78. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 833.
79. 317 U.S. 11 (1942).
80. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 833.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
576
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state concern and has only the most attenuated relation to interstate
commerce, could nonetheless be sustained under the Commerce Clause
based upon no more than the kind of generalized findings of state
shortcomings made here, then Congress could circumvent the
constitutional limits on federal power imposed by both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, and claim a general police
power, because charges that States have failed fully to eradicate or
remedy bias can be made about nearly every area of traditional state
concern.8
4
The court simply refused to accept Congress's determination of the
effect of gender-motivated crimes of violence on interstate com-
merce.
85
2. The Enforcement Clause
In response to appellant's alternative argument that section
13981 is a constitutional exercise of authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that Congress may not
regulate purely private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause. 6 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws .... The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."87
The court reasoned that because the Fourteenth Amendment was
directed at the states, it can only be violated by state action 8 and
Congress did not enact section 13981 as a remedy for state action
violating the Constitution. 9
C. Chief Judge Wilkinson's Concurring Opinion
Chief Judge Wilkinson, in his concurring opinion, examined the
role ofjudicial activism in the past century and concluded that only
in the rarest cases should a court overturn the action of a legislature
and then only when required to preserve the values of our federal
84. Id. at 853 (citation omitted).
85. See Kropf, supra note 50.
86. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 853.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
88. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 861-70.
89. See id.
20001 577
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system.90 Admitting that section 13981 is a good law for society and
that violence against women is a problem that America must
address, Judge Wilkinson maintained that VAWA's civil suit
provision encroaches on state government and its regulation of
domestic relations and, therefore, must be held unconstitutional.9'
According to Judge Wilkinson, "the structural dictates of dual
sovereignty must not ebb and flow with the tides of popular sup-
port."
9 2
D. Judge Niemeyer's Concurring Opinion
Judge Niemeyer, in his concurring opinion, referred to the Tenth
Amendment, which states that those powers "not delegated to the
United States or prohibited to the States by the Constitution [are]
reserved to the States or to the people."93 According to Niemeyer,
allowing an overly broad exercise of the commerce power, like that
required to uphold section 13981, would substantially infringe on
the general police power retained by the states under the Tenth
Amendment.94 Acknowledging that "the volume of interstate
commerce has expanded to the point where today it is difficult to
delineate between interstate and local commerce,"95 Judge
Niemeyer, however, concluded that "a local activity, in order to be
covered by the Commerce Clause power, must have a direct effect on
interstate commerce such that its regulation 'targets' interstate
commercial activity."96 Judge Niemeyer would impose the tort
principle of proximate cause to determine whether an activity is
remote and therefore unapproachable under the Commerce Clause
power.9v In the case at bar, Congress attempted to regulate a social
ill and not commerce.
90. See id. at 889-98 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
91. See id. (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 896 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 898 (Niemeyer, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
94. See id. (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 901 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
97. See id. (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
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E. Judge Motz's Dissent
Judge Motz, who wrote the majority opinion for the Fourth Circuit
panel decision upholding VAWA, wrote the dissent in the en banc
decision and made arguments similar to those made by the panel.9"
According to the dissent, "[t]he majority can reach this conclusion
only by disregarding controlling Supreme Court precedent, by
refusing to give Congress's eminently rational findings proper
deference, by creating troubling new rules of constitutional analysis,
and by mischaracterizing the statute before us."99
"First, the dissent argue[d] that the majority created a new test
by distorting Lopez and disregarding other Supreme Court prece-
dent."'0 0 According to the dissent, Lopez went beyond the two
categories of economic activity and jurisdictional element to
determine that the possession of guns near schools did not substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.' 0 ' The dissent criticized the
majority for misinterpreting Lopez by disregarding other factors
considered by the Court and ignoring the rational basis test
affirmed byLopez.' 2 The substantial congressional record, according
to the dissent, "inexorably leads to the conclusion that Congress had
a rational basis for finding that gender-motivated violence substan-
tially affects interstate commerce." 0 3
Second, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to follow a
model of judicial restraint and to adhere to the strong presumption
of constitutionality for legislative acts.'0 4 Judge Motz argued that
the majority favored federalism over separation of powers. 0 5
According to the dissent, "a court faced with a challenge to an
exercise of the commerce power owes even greater deference to
Congress than a court asked to determine whether a federal statute
violates an express prohibition of the Constitution."0 6
98. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), rev'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
99. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 906 (Motz, J., dissenting).
100. Kropf, supra note 50, at 394.
101. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 917 (Motz, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 906 (Motz, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 921 (Motz, J., dissenting).
105. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 912 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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Third, the dissent criticized the majority's argument that to
uphold VAWA would grant a general police power to the federal
government, arguing that the majority felt the need to draw a line,
and so they did without any precedent or reason for doing so.'07
According to the dissent, the court may not strike down legislation
simply because there must be some limit to congressional authority
out of fear that they may one day enact more invasive legislation." 8
Finally, the dissent argued that VAWA differs from Lopez because
it does not supersede state action, but instead regulates civil rights,
an area of federal concern.0 9 When "there is persuasive evidence
that the states have not adequately protected the rights of a class of
citizens," then it is within Congress's authority to act."' In addition,
the dissent pointed out that Congress noted that "each and every
one of the existing civil rights laws covers an area in which some
aspects are also covered by State laws.""'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Did Lopez Get It Right? Time Will Tell ....
Because the Fourth Circuit based its entire opinion in Brzonkala
on the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Lopez, it is important to
examine Lopez in light of the long line of Supreme Court Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Numerous scholars have noted the change in
the Court's jurisprudence that came with the holding in Lopez." 2
The decision in Lopez has been credited with changing "any
predictive certainty" and "muddl[ing] the well-settled jurisprudence
of the Commerce Clause." 3 Former Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence gave Congress great leeway to promulgate statutes with only
nebulous connections to interstate commerce."' For example,
Supreme Court holdings in Katzenbach, Heart of Atlanta, and
Wickard,"5 to name a few, forwarded the proposition that the
individual's own activity may be insignificant, but when his
107. See id. at 925 (Motz, J., dissenting).
108. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 931 (Motz, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 931 (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 49).
112. See, e.g., Kropf, supra note 50.
113. Id. at 373.
114. See id.
115. See discussion and notes infra Part II.
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contribution is combined with others similarly situated, it is no
longer insignificant and may be regulated by Congress under the
Commerce Clause power. 6 In fact, in Heart of Atlanta, which
concerned the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that Congress was legislating against moral
wrongs, but held the law valid because the evidence proved the
effect of racial discrimination on interstate commerce." 7 Cases along
this line of jurisprudence held that "[i]f it is interstate commerce
that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze.""8 In addition, the Supreme Court
consistently held that the mere fact that Congress said a particular
activity affects commerce does not preclude examination by the
Court, but when the Court finds that Congress had a rational basis
for such a finding, its investigation ends." 9 With Lopez, the Court
attempted to limit this practice, but succeeded in only confusing the
standards by articulating a new standard not found in precedent
(while claiming to be following precedent). 2 o "In fact, 'prior to Lopez,
the concept of a jurisdictional element did not present itself in
Commerce Clause case law."
121
The VAWA decisions demonstrate the difficulty lower courts have
had in applying Lopez. 22 Since VAWA's enactment in 1994, it has
faced several challenges and "[a]lthough these courts relied on
Lopez, they reached different results, demonstrating the difficulty
of applying Lopez." 2 ' Likely, the federal courts' difficulty lies in the
contrast of the standard set forth in Lopez with the long line of
Supreme Courtjurisprudence dating back more than half a century.
B. Did the Fourth Circuit Interpret Lopez and/or Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence Correctly?
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily, if not solely, on Lopez when
ruling that "[u] nder the principles articulated by the Court in Lopez,
116. See, e.g., Katzenbach.v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
117. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241.
118. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Cain, supra note 50, at 403 (quoting Johanna R. Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849, 1859 (1997)).
122. See id.
123. Kropf, supra note 50, at 374.
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it is evident that 42 U.S.C. § 13981, like the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, does not regulate an activity sufficiently related to interstate
commerce to fall even within the broad power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause."1 24 However, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the
Court's holding in Lopez to stand for the proposition that "because
the Gun-Free School Zones Act 'neither regulate[d] a commercial
activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce, it exceeded the
authority of Congress. '""'25 Lopez does not require the presence of
these two elements-regulation of commercial activity and
jurisdiction-in order for a statute to be constitutional. The Court
merely based its decision in Lopez on the lack of these two factors.'26
The Court also looked to the lack of congressional findings and the
fact that the statute displaced state policy in an area of traditional
state concern.
27
The Civil Rights Act, at issue in Katzenbach and Heart of
Atlanta, 28 does not directly regulate an economic activity but has
still been upheld as a constitutional exercise of the Commerce
Clause power. 29 The Court held that discrimination has a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce and never held that the individ-
ual activity need be economic. 0 So long as it has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, the individual activity whether economic or
not, may be regulated.'3 ' The civil right to be free from gender-
motivated violence parallels the civil right to be free from racially-
motivated violence, so the court should evaluate both similarly.
The Fourth Circuit panel held, and defendants Morrison and
Crawford conceded, that Lopez does not hold that a statute must
regulate economic activity to be a constitutional exercise of com-
merce power, reasoning that "[sluch a holding could not be squared
with past Commerce Clause jurisprudence."'32 When struggling to
harmonize its holding with solidly established precedent such as
124. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 830 (4th Cir.
1999).
125. Id. at 831-32 (citations omitted) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551).
126. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-61; Kropf, supra note 50, at 395-96.
127. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 836-52.
128. See discussion and notes supra Part IV.A.
129. See id.
130. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-05; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 255-62.
131. See id.
132. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 972 (4th Cir.
1997).
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Wickard, the Fourth Circuit went so far as to interpret Lopez as
"clearly foreclos [ing] either reliance upon such authority or applica-
tion of such analysis to sustain congressional regulation of
noneconomic activities." 3 ' The Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the
reasoning ofLopez. 34 Lopez did not disturb any prior holding of the
Court but simply declined to expand the holdings to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, especially when Congress itself had not included
any findings of the regulated activity's substantial effect on
interstate commerce. According to the dissent in Brzonkala, "this
new rule depends upon a distorted view of Lopez and a cavalier
disregard for the Supreme Court's other Commerce Clause prece-
dents." 3 ' There is no doubt that the Court's decision inLopez marks
a heightened level of scrutiny and adherence to principles of
federalism, but it by no means marks a destruction of prior Supreme
Court precedent in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The signifi-
cance of Lopez remains unclear, but one thing is clear-Lopez did not
hold that a statute must regulate an economic activity and have a
jurisdictional element in order to be upheld under the Commerce
Clause.3 6
C. A Comparison of VA WA with the Gun-Free School Zones Act
The Violence Against Women Act is very different from the Gun-
Free School Zones Act and therefore, should be evaluated differ-
ently. VAWA differs from the Gun-Free School Zones Act in that: (1)
VAWA regulates an activity that actually affects the national
economy rather than merely threatens to do so; (2) it does not
regulate areas of traditional state concern; (3) the individual
involved in this particular case affected interstate commerce rather
than just threatening to do so; and finally, (4) Congress produced
extensive findings concluding that violence against women has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.131
First, "[u]nlike the mere threat of violence involved in the Gun-
Free School Zones Act overturned inLopez, section 13981 deals with
133. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir.
1999).
134. See Cain, supra note 50, at 401-04.
135. Id.
136. See generally Darold W. Killmer & Mar Newman, VAWA- A Civil Rights Tool for
Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence, 28 COLO. LAW. 77 (Sept. 1999).
137. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820.
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actual acts of gender-based violence, whose impact on interstate
commerce, though indirect, is far from remote or speculative."13 The
government, in Lopez, argued that the possession of a firearm in
school may result in violent crime that in turn may affect the
national economy because of the costs of violent crime and the
threat to the educational process created by the presence of guns in
schools. 39 VAWA, by contrast, regulates a behavior that Congress
has found substantially affects interstate commerce. 0 The findings
demonstrate that violence against women affirmatively impacts the
economy and interstate commerce.14 ' In the case of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, the Court held that gun possession in a school
zone may or may not affect the economy.4 2
Second, VAWA does not infringe on traditional areas of state
concern." Although criminal law has traditionally been an area of
state concern', VAWA offers a civil rather than a criminal remedy.'
In addition, VAWA supplements state law rather than supplants it.
In fact, VAWA expressly excludes any state-law claims for divorce,
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
from federal jurisdiction.'45 The statute does not prevent the states
from exercising their police power to combat gender-motivated
violent crimes, but rather offers an additional remedy to the victims
of those crimes. Nothing in the statute prevents the victim or the
state from bringing state criminal charges or tort actions. Section
13981 regulates conduct implicating civil rights, and civil rights are
an area of federal, not state, concern.
Third, the respondent in Lopez was a student at a local high
school and, unlike Brzonkala, he had not moved in interstate
commerce.'46 Brzonkala, on the other hand, was a resident of
Minnesota attending a university in Virginia."' After the rape,
Brzonkala was so upset and fearful that she was forced to withdraw
from the university and return home to Minnesota. 48 She then
138. Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
139. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
140. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 965-68 (4th
Cir. 1997).
141. See id.
142. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
143. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996).
144. See Brzonkola, 132 F.3d at 970-71.
145. See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
146. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
147. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820.
148. See id.
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attended a college located within four miles of her parent's home
and lived with her parents while attending that school.149 Her
actions illustrate the effect gender-motivated violence has on
interstate travel: the fear of rape and violent assault discourages
women from traveling. This fear reduces their visits to restaurants
or hotels set up to meet the needs of interstate travelers just as the
discrimination of members of certain races discouraged those races
from interstate travel when the Civil Rights Act was enacted.
Finally, VAWA differs from the Gun-Free School Zones Act
because of the voluminous findings Congress made when it enacted
VAWA. Among its findings are statistics such as: "Violence is the
leading cause of injury to women ages 15-44, ""15 and "for the past 4
years, the U.S. Surgeons General have warned that family vio-
lence-not heart attacks or cancer or strokes-poses the single largest
threat of injury to adult women in this country." 5' These congressio-
nal findings, as the Court noted, were lacking in the government's
argument in Lopez.'52
D. VAWA As a Constitutional Exercise of the Enforcement Clause
Power of the Fourteenth Amendment
In Brzonkala, appellants initially defended section 13981 under
Congress's power pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but after the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores,53 retreated to defend VAWA primarily as an exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. City of Boerne held
that the Enforcement Clause power only extends to the enforcement
of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is remedial
and not substantive.'54 Therefore, since the Fourteenth Amendment
is directed to the states, Congress may only use its Enforcement
Clause power to remedy state actions. Because VAWA provides a
civil remedy for private conduct, it is difficult to argue that it falls
under the Enforcement Clause power. However, the Supreme Court
has held that a state may have a duty to act when private individu-
als violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the state's failure to act
149. See id.
150. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
151. Id. at 41-42.
152. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
153. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
154. See id. at 520.
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is a state action itself that Congress can regulate via its Enforce-
ment Clause power.15' The majority of courts that heard cases
involving VAWA have held it unnecessary to consider whether the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact VAWA
because they have held that the Commerce Clause grants Congress
such authority.'56 The Fourth Circuit held that "without any
individualized showing of unconstitutional state action ... Congress
may not regulate purely private conduct pursuant to its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power." 5 7
E. Other Court Opinions on the Constitutionality of VAWA
The Fourth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of Lopez is not
shared by other circuits. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Bolton,'58 held that "if a state regulates an activity which, through
repetition, in aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, 'the de minimus character of the individual instances
arising under the statute is of no consequence.'"'59 In United States
v. Weslin,"6 ° the Second Circuit held that "Congress may regulate to
prevent the inhibition or diminution of interstate commerce... even
when the activity controlled itself is not commercial."' 6 '
The district courts have been almost unanimous in holding that
gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate com-
merce. Fifteen district courts, including four since the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Brzonkala, have upheld VAWA, reasoning that
the voluminous legislative record is clear evidence of the direct
connection between VAWA and interstate commerce. 162 As put by
one commentator,
Less than a month after the Fourth Circuit rendered its opinion,
a federal district judge in New York agreed with the other eleven
district courts and admonished the Fourth Circuit for its finding
[stating that]
155. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
156. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996).
157. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 862.
158. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
159. Id. at 399 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58).
160. 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 296 (citation omitted).
162. See Killmer & Newman, supra note 136.
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"[a] federal court should pause long and hard before declaring
unconstitutional a statutory provision that is the product of such
lengthy inquiry and detailed findings by... Congress itself consisting
of the democratically elected representatives of the several states."1"
In Doe v. Doe, 64 the first case to challenge the constitutionality of
section 13981, the court reasoned:
repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding, withdrawing or
limiting their participation in the workplace or marketplace in
response to or as a result of gender-based violence or the threat
thereof, is of such a nature to be as substantial an impact on interstate
commerce as the effect of excess "home-grown" wheat harvesting which
was found to have been properly regulated by Congressional
enactment. 6 -
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in
Brzonkala v. Morrison.66 Many courts, constitutional scholars, and
attorneys anxiously await this opinion. It is difficult to predict
whether the Supreme Court will limit its prior interpretations of the
Commerce Clause power and affirm the Fourth Circuit, or whether
it will agree with the majority of district courts who have held that
VAWA falls within the already set boundaries of Commerce Clause
power. It is clear that many are waiting for the Supreme Court to
clarify its reasoning in Lopez, which has confused lower courts for
the past four years. One scholar has commented that the Court only
has two options-"[e]ither it must overturn much of the Commerce
Clause principles adopted over the past fifty years, significantly
limiting the power of the federal government... [o]r it must make
it perfectly clear that application of the Wickard aggregate effects
test... is limited to solely commercial activities.""'
The current Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has followed
a theme of state autonomy without unnecessary interference by
163. Lisa Gelhaus, Constitutional Challenge to VAWA Raises Ire, TRIAL, June 1999, at 14
(quoting Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
164. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
165. Id. at 614; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
166. See Brzonkala v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 WL 41232 (Jan. 11, 2000).
167. Kolenc, supra note 53, at 931.
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federal courts.16 According to constitutional scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky, "the most significant trend in the decisions by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's Court is protecting state sover-
eignty."'69 "In a series of decisions over the last four years, culminat-
ing in June with three handed down on the final day of the court's
term, the court invoked principles of federalism and sovereign
immunity to circumscribe the power of Congress to identify
problems in need of uniform national solutions."' Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia have all been
active proponents of maintaining states' rights, especially in the
areas of education and criminal law.'7 ' However, both Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor concurred separately inLopez to "emphasize
the delicate balance required when the Court makes difficult choices
on federalism principles" and to warn "that the Court should not
return to an outdated understanding of commerce.""72 These Justices
may not be willing to extend the limitations on Commerce Clause
power set forth by the Court in Lopez.
Since its passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been openly critical
of VAWA's constitutionality. Only a year ago, Rehnquist referred to
VAWA
as one of "the more notable examples" of "a series of laws passed by
Congress that have expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts" and
that have raised the "[p]rospect that our system will look more and
more like the French government, where even the most minor details
are ordained by the national government in Paris."1 3
Justice Scalia has also been particularly outspoken in efforts to
decrease the caseload of the federal courts. 74 These concerns,
however, were addressed when section 13981 was specifically
altered to restrict federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction over any
168. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 33
(1997).
169. Gelhaus, supra note 163, at 16.
170. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Rule on Right of Women to Sue Their Attackers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A20.
171. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 168, at 31-33.
172. Kolenc, supra note 53, at 876.
173. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 842 n.12 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 11, 1998)).
174. See SMITH, supra note 168, at 32.
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claim for divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital
property, or child custody. 75
In addition, if the Court overturns section 13981 of VAWA, it will
be forced to distinguish many civil rights laws enacted under the
Commerce Clause and/or the Fourteenth Amendment since those
also apply to actions by private individuals rather than state actors
and have the same nexus to interstate commerce. Given this grave
predicament, the voluminous jurisprudence granting broad Com-
merce Clause authority that would have to be distinguished or
overruled if the Fourth Circuit is upheld, and the expansive
Congressional findings of the substantial effect of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce, the Court will likely uphold the
constitutionality of section 13981 of VAWA and distinguish it from
the Gun-Free School Zones Act. However, given the nature of the
current Court's position on state sovereignty and reduced federal
intervention, this prediction is not a certainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the three Brzonkala opinions, the Lopez
decision has left lower courts without guidance in their efforts to
analyze cases based on the Commerce Clause. It is now up to the
Supreme Court to redefine the boundaries of this authority clearly
and precisely so that lower courts can effectively rely on its reason-
ing. Brzonkala v. Morrison offers the Supreme Court the perfect
opportunity to perform this essential function.
Christine M. Devey
175. See Cain, supra note 50, at 385.
20001

